Abstract-We consider the problem of designing the measurement matrix for high dimensional signal detection based on compressed measurements while ensuring physical layer secrecy. We assume that the network operates in the presence of an eavesdropper who intends to discover the state of the nature being monitored. To keep the data secret from the eavesdropper, we propose to use cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the fusion center by injecting artificial noise to deceive the eavesdropper. We design measurement matrices to obtain compressed data at distributed nodes so that the detection performance of the network is maximized while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy. The design of optimal measurement matrices depends on the signal being detected, and we provide solution considering three different scenarios: 1) the signal is known; 2) the signal lies in a low dimensional subspace; and 3) the signal is sparse. We show that the detection performance of the system can be improved while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy by using optimized measurements along with noise injection based techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE THEORY of compressed sensing (CS) mostly deals with reconstructing a sparse signal based on a small number of measurements obtained via low dimensional projections [1] . The use of CS based measurement schemes in solving inference problems, such as, detection, classification and estimation has attracted considerable attention in [2] and [3] . A CS based measurement scheme, however, may incur a certain performance loss due to compression when compared to the traditional measurement scheme. In our previous paper [4] , we proposed a collaborative compressed detection (CCD) framework to compensate for the performance loss due to compression at a single node. In a CCD framework, the fusion center (FC) receives compressed observation vectors obtained via random projections from the spatially distributed nodes and makes the global decision about the presence of the signal vector. However, the random measurement scheme used in [2] and our previous paper [4] to exploit the signal structure that may be known a priori.
To further improve the detection performance, optimization of the measurement scheme can be performed by exploiting the signal structure. Measurement matrix design in the context of sparse signal recovery from compressed measurements has been considered in [5] and [6] . In [7] , the authors considered the measurement matrix design problem in the context of sparse signal detection with a single sensor based on compressed measurements. In [5] - [7] , measurement matrices were constrained to the class of tight frames in order to avoid coloring the noise covariance matrix. In [8] , the measurement matrix was designed for the detection of a known sparse signal from compressed measurements. In the same context, heuristic or algorithmic approaches were proposed in [9] for measurement matrix design. All of these single sensor based approaches incur a certain performance loss due to compression. As discussed earlier, this loss can be recovered using multiple spatially distributed nodes in a CCD framework. In a CCD framework, transmissions by the nodes, however, may be observed by an eavesdropper. The secrecy of a detection system, defined in terms of the information leakage to the eavesdropper, is of utmost importance in many applications. Recently, a few attempts have been made to address the problem of eavesdropping threats on distributed detection networks [10] .
In this letter, our goal is to design measurement matrices at distributed nodes for collaborative compressed detection that exploit the underlying signal structure so that a desired detection performance level is achieved while guaranteeing a certain level of physical layer secrecy. We show that the performance of the CCD framework can be significantly improved by using optimized measurement matrices along with artificial noise injection based techniques. More specifically, we design optimal measurement matrices which maximize the detection performance of the network while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy considering three different scenarios: 1) the signal of interest s is known, 2) s lies in low dimensional subspace, and 3) s is sparse.
II. OBSERVATION MODEL

A. Collaborative Compressive Detection
Consider two hypotheses H 0 (signal is absent) and H 1 (signal is present). Also, consider a parallel network, comprised of a fusion center (FC) and a set of N distributed nodes, which faces the task of determining which of the two hypotheses is true (see Figure 1) . At the ith node, the observed signal, u i , can be modeled as
for i = 1, . . . , N, where u i is the P × 1 observation vector, s is the signal vector to be detected, v i is the additive Gaussian noise with v i ∼ N (0, σ 2 I P ) where I P is the P × P identity matrix. Observations at the nodes are assumed to be conditionally independent and identically distributed. Each node carries out local compression (low dimensional projection) and sends an M-length compressed version y i of its P-length observation u i to the FC. The collection of M-length (< P) sampled observations is given by, y i = φu i , where φ is an M × P measurement matrix, which is assumed to be the same for all the nodes, and y i is the M×1 compressed observation vector (local summary statistic). Under the two hypotheses, the compressed measurements are
The FC makes the global decision about the phenomenon based on the received compressed measurement vectors, y = [y 1 , . . . , y N ]. We also assume that there is an eavesdropper present in the network who intends to discover the state of nature being monitored by the system.
B. Artificial Noise Injection Model
To keep the data regarding the presence of the phenomenon secret from the eavesdropper, in our previous work [4] , we used cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the FC by injecting noise in the signal sent to the eavesdroppers to improve the secrecy performance of the system which is defined in Section III. It was assumed that B out of N nodes (or α = B/N fraction of the nodes) tamper their data y i and sendỹ i as follows: Under H 0 :
Under H 1 :
where D i = γ s is a P × 1 vector with constant values. The parameter γ > 0 represents the noise strength, which is zero for non noise injecting nodes. We assume that the observation model and noise injection parameters are known to both the FC and the eavesdropper. The only information unavailable at the eavesdropper is the identity of the noise injecting nodes. Thus, the eavesdropper considers each node i to be injecting noise with a certain probability α. The FC can distinguish between y i andỹ i . The values of (P 0 1 , P 0 2 ) and (P 1 1 , P 1 2 ) are system dependent and cannot be optimized in many scenarios which limits the secrecy performance of the system. Thus, in this letter, we design optimal measurement matrix φ that can be used along with artificial noise injection based techniques to improve the performance of the system.
III. COLLABORATIVE COMPRESSIVE DETECTION
IN THE PRESENCE OF AN EAVESDROPPER We use the deflection coefficient as the detection performance metric in lieu of the probability of error of the system. Deflection coefficient characterizes the output signal to noise ratio and is widely used in optimizing the performance of detection systems. The deflection coefficient at the ith node is defined as
where μ i j and i j are the mean vector and the covariance matrix of y i under the hypothesis H j , respectively. Using these notations, the deflection coefficient at the FC can be written aŝ 
where τ ≥ 0 is referred to as the physical layer secrecy constraint which reflects the secrecy performance of the system. 
Next, we solve (4) under various assumptions on the signal structure, e.g., known, low dimensional or sparse.
IV. OPTIMAL MEASUREMENT MATRIX DESIGN WITH PHYSICAL LAYER SECRECY GUARANTEES
First, we explore some properties of the deflection coefficient at the FC and at the eavesdropper which will be used to simplify the measurement matrix design problem. 
for any arbitrary signal s. For the random measurement matrix,
. The factor M/N can be seen as the performance loss due to compression as the random measurement matrix fails to exploit the signal structure that may be known a priori. To improve performance, we consider the optimization of the measurement matrix by exploiting the signal structure while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy. We show that any arbitrary secrecy constraint can be guaranteed by properly choosing the measurement matrix.
A. Known Signal Detection
First, we consider the case where s is known. Lemma 1: When s is known, the optimal value of the objective function of (5) is given by δ * = min( s 2 2 ,
Proof: The proof follows from the fact thatP is an orthogonal projection operator, thus, P s 
Note that, without a physical layer secrecy constraint (or when θ = 0), the optimal value of the objective function is s 2 2 . Thus, there is no performance loss due to compression. With a physical layer secrecy constraint, θ serves as a tuning parameter to guarantee a certain level of secrecy. Note that, for the optimal φ * as given in Lemma 2, we have P s = σ 2
which is nothing but the physical layer secrecy constraint. Thus, by tuning θ we are equivalently tuning τ and controlling the secrecy level. This approach provides the optimal measurement matrix with a secrecy guarantee for known s. However, in certain practical scenarios, we do not have an exact knowledge of s. Next, we consider the cases where s is not completely known.
B. Low Dimensional Signal Detection
In this subsection, we consider the case where s is not completely known but is known to lie in a low dimensional subspace. We assume that s resides in a K-dimensional subspace where K < N. That is to say, s can be expressed as s = Zβ where Z is an N × K matrix, whose columns are orthonormal, and β is the K × 1 signal vector. Without loss of generality, we assume that β 2 2 = 1. Next, we look at the following two cases: 1) Z can be designed, 2) Z is fixed and known. For both the cases, we assume that β is deterministic but unknown and find φ that maximizes the worst case detection performance. Formally, for the case where Z is a design parameter, the problem can be stated as
where
We state the Courant-Fischer theorem which will be used to solve the above optimization problem.
Theorem 1 (Courant-Fischer [12] ): Let A be a symmetric matrix with eigenvalues λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ N and S denote the any j-dimensional linear subspace of C N . Then,
Lemma 3: When s lies in a low dimensional signal subspace, the optimal value of the objective function of (6) is given by δ * = min( β 2 2 , ) if K ≤ M, and δ * = 0, otherwise. Proof: Using Courant-Fischer theorem, we can show that the problem (6) without a physical layer secrecy constraint is equivalent to max φ M×N λ k (P). Now, the proof follows by observing thatP is the orthogonal projection operator and its eigenvalues are given by λ i = 1 for i = 1 to M and λ i = 0 for i = M + 1 to N.
Next, we assume that K ≤ M and characterize the optimal measurement matrix φ * and the optimal subspace Z * .
Lemma 4:
When s = Zβ and K ≤ M, the optimal (φ * , Z * ) which achieves δ * should satisfy the following condition: for
Proof: For the proof please refer to [11] . Thus, for any fixed φ, one can choose Z accordingly, so that the upper bound δ * can be achieved. Next, we look at the case where Z is fixed and we only optimize φ. Observe that,
For a fixed Z, the optimal value δ * of problem (6) serves as an upper bound. To simplify the problem, we introduce an (N × N) matrix Q to guarantee secrecy. In other words, y i = φQu i where Q is determined to guarantee secrecy. Next, we find φ for which this upper bound is achievable for (Z, Q).
Lemma 5 Proof: For the proof please refer to [11] .
For both the cases, where Z can be designed and where Z is fixed and known, without a secrecy constraint, the optimal value of the objective function is s 2 2 .
C. Sparse Signal Detection
In this subsection, we assume that s is K-sparse in the standard canonical basis and s 2 = 1. The exact number of nonzero entries in s, their locations, and their values are assumed to be unknown. We design φ which maximizes the worst case detection performance by employing a lexicographic optimization approach. 1 Formally, the problem is
where A K−1 is the set of solutions to the above optimization problem for sparsity level K − 1 and is defined in (6).
Lemma 6: There is no performance loss while solving the problem (7) if we restrict our solution space to be matrices on the Stiefel manifold S t (M, N), where
Proof: The proof follows from the observation that π M = I M for frames φ = U[π M , 0]V T in Stiefel manifold and the value of P s 2 2 is independent of π M and U. Next, we limit our focus on Stiefel manifolds and establish an upper bound on the value of the objective function in (7) for different sparsity levels. Later, we find measurement matrices which can achieve this upper bound.
Lemma 7: For the sparsity level K = 1, the optimal value of the objective function of (7) is min( M N , ). For K ≥ 2, an 1 We first find a set of solutions that are optimal for a k 1 -sparse signal. Then, within this set, we find a subset of solutions that are also optimal for (k 1 + 1)-sparse signals. This approach is known as a lexicographic optimization. . Proof: For the proof please refer to [11] . Lemma 8: The optimal measurement matrix (φ * , Q * ), for the K sparse signal case y i = φQs is given by:
• For K = 1, φ * is a uniform tight frame with norm values equal to √ M/N and Q * = cos θ I N×N , • For K ≥ 2, φ * is an equiangular tight frame with norm values equal to √ M/N and Q * = cos θ I N×N . Proof: Proof follows from the definition of uniform/ equiangular tight frames [13] and the observation that upper bounds in Lemma 7 can be reached only by these frames.
Without a secrecy constraint (i.e., θ = 0), our results reduce to the ones in [7] . With a secrecy constraint θ serves as a tuning parameter to guarantee an arbitrary level of secrecy. Also, it is shown that a real equiangular tight frame can exist only if N ≤ M(M + 1)/2, and a complex equiangular tight frame requires N ≤ M 2 [13] . When M and N do not satisfy this condition, the bound in Lemma 7 can not be achieved and one can employ a heuristic or an algorithmic approach [9] .
In this letter, we designed measurement matrices with secrecy guarantees for signal detection purposes. It was shown that the optimal design depends on the nature of the signal to be detected. Further, we showed that the detection performance of the system can be improved while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy by using optimized measurement matrices along with artificial noise injection based techniques.
